

EURAD-2 WP-17 «CSFD»

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CRITICALITY SAFETY IN THE FINAL DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

- High-level radioactive waste (e.g. irradiated nuclear fuel) still contains certain amounts of fissile material.
- Under very specific circumstances, this could potentially lead to new fission chain reactions ocurring in the deep geological repository (DGR).
- Criticality safety of the DGR is a safety requirement in all national programmes that have to dispose of high-level waste.
- Criticality safety typically to be ensured and demonstrated both in the operational and in the postclosure phase of the DGR.



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CRITICALITY SAFETY IN THE FINAL DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE - II

- Criticality safety in the operational phase:
 - Limited time frame → direct controls/actions;
 - Analogous to measures for criticality control implemented in nuclear facilities presently in operation.



- Criticality safety in the post-closure phase:
 - Long time frames: orders of magnitude larger than in any other areas of the fuel cycle;
 - Handling of uncertainties associated to the long-term evolution of the system.



• The DGR post-closure phase requires a dedicated approach due to the long time frames.

CRITICALITY SAFETY IN THE FINAL DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE - III

• The R&D work in WP-17 addresses the challenges of ensuring and demonstrating post-closure criticality safety for long time scales.

- Two key aspects of criticality safety for final disposal:
 - Identifying, optimising and implementing measures to ensure criticality safety of DGR;
 - Developing methods to perform criticality safety assessments
 → basis for the criticality safety case for national final disposal concepts.



WP-17 «CSFD» - PARTICIPATING ORGANISATIONS

• WP-17 comprises contributions from 24 partner organisations from 13 different countries:





WP-17 «CSFD» - OBJECTIVES

- Support national programmes in ensuring criticality safety for their DGR concepts and inventories;
- Consolidate the technical basis of the criticality safety argumentation for final disposal of fissile wastes:
 - Explore the optimisation potential of **measures for ensuring criticality** safety in final disposal focus on post-closure phase:
 - Technical measures: e.g. optimising the design of final disposal containers for high-level waste;
 - Administrative measures: e.g. deriving fissile material limits per waste package (loading curves);
 - etc.
 - Further develop & improve understanding of methodology to assess their effectiveness
 - Validation and experimental verification of criticality safety assessments.



WP-17 – R&D ACTIONS' LANDSCAPE

Research measures to ensure criticality safety

Administrative measures:

- **Task 5**: Development of methodology for deriving fissile mass limits for spent fuel & ILW packages.
- **Task 2**: Fissile waste records for criticality safety assessments.

Technical measures:

• **Task 5**: Investigate factors that influence the derivation of fissile material limits with a view to optimise waste package & barrier design.

Develop methodology for post-closure criticality safety case

Evaluate performance of crit.-safety measures:

- **Task 3**: Validation of long-term evolution scenarios for post-closure criticality safety (PCCS) assessments
- Task 4: Verification of model implementation for PCCS assessments
- **Task 6**: Experimental basis for validation of depletion and criticality codes for PCCS

Criticality consequence assessments

• **Task 7**: Develop and consolidate methodology for assessing criticality in the DGR post-closure phase.

Communication to stakeholders

• **Task 2**: Develop an effective communication strategy to all relevant stakeholders (general public, national regulator, etc).



WP-17: TASK 2 – KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

- **Objectives**: Capture knowledge & transfer to community
- Envisioned technical work:
 - Development of documentation material
 - Knowledge transfer

- Fissile waste package records for criticality safety assessments
- Communication approach regarding criticality safety for final disposal



- Task Lead: EIMV
- Participants: Andra, EIMV, CVUT, LEI, PURAM, SURAO, SSTC NRC, Posiva/TVO, BGE, NWS, GSL, Jacobs/Amentum, Nagra.

• Deliverables:

- D17.1 & D17.5: Two SoTA reports on demonstrating criticality safety
- D17.4: Report on communicating DGR post-closure criticality safety
- D17.6 Report to Member-States



WP-17: TASK 3 – VALIDATION OF LONG-TERM EVOLUTION SCENARIOS

Objectives:

- research long-term waste package and DGR evolution to support the definition of scenarios for criticality assessments;
- demonstrate that there is a basis for confidence in the definition and selection of scenarios for criticality safety assessments.

Envisioned technical work:

- Identify FEP relevant for post-closure criticality safety
- Evaluation of identified FEP
- Develop methodology for scenario validation





• Task Leads: Andra & SSTC NRC

Participants:

Andra, VTT, GRS, CIEMAT, CVUT, JSI, LEI, SKB, SURAO, SSTC NRC, Posiva/TVO, GSL, Jacobs/Amentum, Sandia Lab., PNNL.

• Deliverables:

 Input to D17.7: report on repository post-closure criticality scenarios and their assessment.

WP-17: TASK 4 – VERIFICATION OF CRIT-SAFETY MODEL IMPLEMENTATION

Objectives:

- understand criticality scenario modelling approaches
- develop a methodology to evaluate scenarios
- verify whether the computational models appropriately represent the scenarios and include a suitable treatment of uncertainty and appropriate model simplifications.
- Envisioned technical work:
 - Review post-closure criticality scenario modelling approaches
 - Develop method to evaluate scenarios
 & modelling approaches
 - Sensitivity analysis of scenario uncertainties & model simplifications





• Task Leads: VTT & GSL

Participants:

Andra, VTT, GRS, CIEMAT, CVUT, JSI, LEI, SKB, Tractebel, SSTC NRC, GSL, Jacobs/Amentum, Sandia Lab., PNNL.

• Deliverables:

• Input to D17.7: report on repository post-closure criticality scenarios and their assessment.

WP-17: TASK 5 – DEVELOPMENT OF METHODS FOR DERIVING FISSILE MASS LIMITS

Objectives:

- improve understanding of modelling and technical approaches to deriving spent fuel loading curves & ILW fissile mass limits
- explore optimisation potential w.r.t. waste package and engineered barrier designs based on factors that influence the calculation of fissile material limits
- Envisioned technical work:
 - Research spent fuel loading curve derivation approaches
 - Research ILW fissile mass limits derivation approaches
 - Explore optimisation potential for waste package & engineered barrier design



• Task Leads: PSI & PURAM

• Participants:

Andra, VTT, GRS, CIEMAT, CVUT, ENRESA, JSI, LEI, PURAM, SKB, Tractebel, SSTC NRC, BGE, NWS, GSL, Jacobs/Amentum, Nagra, PSI, Sandia Lab, PNNL.

• Deliverables:

 Input to D17.7: report on repository post-closure criticality scenarios and their assessment.

WP-17: TASK 6 – EXPERIMENTAL BASIS FOR VALIDATING CRITICALITY CODES

Objectives:

- Identify the experimental data required for post-closure criticality assessment needs
- Envision types of experimental programmes that could address any significant gaps and uncertainties.
- Envisioned technical work:
 - Perform gap analysis to identify where new data is required



 Carry out survey on experience in obtaining experimental data

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• Task Lead: SKB

Participants:

GRS, CIEMAT, CVUT, JSI, SKB, Tractebel, GSL, Jacobs/Amentum, Nagra, EPFL, PSI, Sandia Lab, PNNL.

• Deliverables:

• D17.2: Report on experimental data needs to support postclosure criticality safety assessments.

WP-17: TASK 7 – EXPERIMENTAL BASIS FOR VALIDATING CRITICALITY CODES

Objectives:

• Develop methodology for assessing the impact of hypothetical, postulated criticality events on repository barrier system and overall repository performance.

Envisioned technical work:

- Research mechanisms for different types of postulated criticality events in DGR
- Research approaches to assessing impacts of criticality on engineered and natural barriers
- Develop models and methods to do post-closure criticality consequence assessments





• Task Leads: NWS & JSI

• Participants:

Andra, VTT, CIEMAT, JSI, LEI, PURAM, SKB, Tractebel, SSTC NRC, Posiva/TVO, NWS, GSL, Jacobs/Amentum, EPFL, Sandia Lab, PNNL.

Deliverables:

• D17.3: Report on methodology for assessing consequences of postulated DGR post-closure criticality.

WP-17 – INTERFACE & SYNERGIES WITH OTHER EURAD-2 WP

• WP-8 SAREC:

 Studies and tests on spent fuel leaching and matrix dissolution are relevant to understand the long-term behaviour of spent fuel → Link to WP-17 Tasks 3 and 4.

WP-9 InCoManD:

- Studies on spent fuel container materials and their durability are relevant for:
 - The specification of long-term post-closure criticality scenarios
 → Link to WP-17 Tasks 3 and Task 4
 - The optimisation of spent fuel container designs to mitigate post-closure criticality safety concerns → Link to WP-17 Task 5.



SUMMARY

- Criticality safety of a DGR is a safety requirement in all national programmes that must dispose of high-level waste such as spent nuclear fuel.
- WP-17 "CSFD" supports national final disposal programmes in ensuring criticality safety for their DGR concepts and inventories:
 - Identifying, further developing and optimising measures for ensuring criticality safety in final disposal focus on the DGR post-closure phase;
 - Further development & understanding of methodologies to assess the effectiveness of these methods.
- WP-17 "CSFD" contributes by consolidating the technical basis of the criticality safety argumentation for final disposal of fissile wastes.
- The planned R&D programme will be carried out in collaboration between 23 partner organisations from 13 different countries (10 Member-States and 3 Associated Partners).





We are looking forward to a fruitful cooperation!

THANK YOU



EURAD-2 Kick-Off Meeting

WP-17 TIME PLAN



